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UK-Russia Political Relations 
Introduction 
„Spy scandal strains relations between Russia and Britain‟ proclaimed the headlines.1 The 
British prime minister and Russian president both sought to downplay accusations from 
the Russian security services that the United Kingdom had been engaged in espionage in 
Moscow, using agents who were ostensibly working as diplomats in the British embassy. 
At the highest political level both sides were keen to talk up the continuing good relations 
between the two countries, building on recent successful summits between president and 
prime minister, and more formal state visits just a couple of years earlier between the 
Queen and the president. Such good relations, it was emphasised, stemmed from longer 
lasting modes of cooperation based on trade links, investments, and Russia‟s relations 
with such bodies as the EU, NATO, the UN, and the OSCE. 
The headline noted above is from 1996. A tit-for-tat agreed withdrawal of four British 
diplomats from Moscow and four Russian diplomats from London served as a reminder 
that despite the end of the Cold War and the development of warm relations between 
Russia and the UK, the collection of covert information still went on between friendly 
states. This arose in May 1996, just a month after Prime Minister John Major had visited 
President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow, and less than two years since Queen Elizabeth II had 
made her historic state visit to Russia in October 1994. 
The situation the headline describes, however, could apply to either 1996 or 2006. In 
January 2006 the Russian state security service, the FSB, named four British diplomats in 
the Moscow Embassy as spies, producing film footage of what it said were these British 
spies retrieving data from a fake rock packed with computer equipment and located in a 
Moscow park. Since the film footage showed the „rock‟ being taken away by the 
individual concerned, the FSB had to explain how they were able to display a „British spy 
rock‟ to the media. The answer came from the FSB that their agents had spent a month 
scouring Moscow for similar rocks before eventually discovering one and revealing it 
along with the earlier film footage.
2
 Just as in 1996, a meeting between the countries‟ 
leaders – by now Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Vladimir Putin – had been 
held just months earlier, in June 2005, in Moscow and had been talked up positively by 
both sides. Two years earlier, in June 2003, Putin had become the first Russian leader in 
125 years to be granted a full state visit to London. 
Superficially then, it would seem that little has changed in Russian-British relations in the 
past decade. The spy scandals show lingering distrust; the public way in which these 
cases were resolved is not the norm for firm and long-standing allies. Nonetheless, that 
no serious breach apparently occurred is indicative of the commitment on both sides to a 
cooperative and developing relationship. Indeed so often have formal declarations to this 
effect been made that Russian defence minister, Sergei Ivanov, when opening a meeting 
with the then British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in October 2001, declared that it had 
                                                 
1
 www.cnn.com/WORLD/9605/07/russia.britain.spy  
2
 „Fake Rock Is Worth Millions‟, The Moscow Times, 27 January 2006, p. 2 
 2 
become a cliché to utter some phrase about the „dynamic development‟ of Russian-
British relations on such occasions.
3
 
Underneath the surface, however, much has changed in the UK‟s relationship with Russia 
since the 1990s. Such changes have turned out largely for the worse as the end of the 
Blair-Putin era nears. It is this apparent decline in Britain-Russia relations which this 
chapter briefly explores, concentrating on elite-level relations and outlining a series of 
developments which have both caused and reflected this decline in relations. 
It is important to emphasise at the outset, however, that a focus on high-profile and elite-
level events is not the whole story. In fact, issues which make the headlines – such as spy 
scandals, visa and extradition refusals, and apparent tension between prime minister and 
president – although seemingly constant irritants, are to some extent „surface‟ issues with 
temporary resonance. Undergirding Britain‟s relationship with Russia are more 
permanent interests, such as trade, energy, investment and security. 
Furthermore, Britain‟s relationship with Russia is conducted in a wider context: contacts 
are ongoing, agreements are reached, and international obligations signed up to within the 
context of the United Nations, the G8, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, EU-Russian 
relations, NATO-Russian relations. That I focus here on the bilateral impediments 
hampering UK-Russian relations in mid-2006 is not to imply that the relationship is in 
crisis. Undergirding factors and overarching frameworks provide a context of greater 
stability and mutual interest than is apparent throughout much of this chapter.  
 
Blair and Putin – Auspicious Beginnings 
Both Prime Minister Blair and President Putin have set great store in personal diplomacy. 
Blair‟s conviction that his persuasive charm face-to-face can exert influence on 
international events has been evident on numerous occasions, such as during the Kosovo 
crisis in 1999 and in the aftermath of 9/11. The former Conservative foreign secretary, Sir 
Malcolm Rifkind, noted this trait of Blair‟s with specific reference to the Blair-Putin 
meeting of April 2003 in Moscow, declaring that: 
„The prime minister has this extraordinary belief that personal relations can 
overcome national interests. They can‟t. Where there is sufficient common 
ground a good personal relationship can make a difference. But no leader can 
be expected to override national interests … There is this assumption that 
because Russia is not communist it will be another western country. We are a 
long way from that.‟4 
Similarly, Putin, immediately on taking office, showed himself to be a foreign policy 
activist. He began a series of foreign trips designed to demonstrate that he is personally 
engaged in international affairs to a far greater extent than his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. 
In his first ten months in office he visited the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, China, 
Japan, Mongolia, Cuba, North Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
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Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Not only does Putin speak fluent German, but he also 
made it his business on taking office to learn English, progressing sufficiently to be able 
to converse with Tony Blair in private during his visit Moscow in 2003.  
At the beginning of the Putin era Blair was of particular interest to Russia‟s new regime 
for several reasons. The relatively young British prime minister was seen as a key player 
in Europe in the coming years. It was Blair perhaps more than any other who had driven 
the NATO intervention in Kosovo of 1999, thereby demonstrating his influence both in 
Europe and in the United States, and was prominent amongst EU leaders in supporting 
rapid enlargement eastwards. He was therefore seen in Moscow as a potential bridge 
between Russia and the US. Although Putin was quite able to conduct his own diplomacy 
with US President Clinton, a good relationship with Blair, who was close to Clinton 
personally and in policy terms, could only enhance Russia‟s attempts to rebuild relations 
with the US, which had been damaged both by the Kosovo conflict and President 
Yeltsin‟s increasingly erratic attitude towards the US. Furthermore, with Clinton due to 
step down at the end of 2000, the Blair-Putin relationship could provide a degree of 
stability against the background to the change of president in the US. 
In addition to these foreign policy reasons for emphasising the importance of the Blair-
Putin relationship, there was also a good deal of interest amongst the Putin team in the 
„new Labour‟ project, and the way in which the Labour government in Britain handled 
the packaging and communication of policies. In short, members of Putin‟s team thought 
that they may have something to learn from the Blair camp. 
The Blair-Putin relationship initially flourished. Indeed arguably it flourished with 
unseemly haste on Blair‟s part in an attempt to steal a march over the other major 
European powers, specifically France and Germany. The unseemly nature of initial Blair-
Putin contacts lies in Blair‟s ill-advised meeting with Putin in St Petersburg two weeks 
before Russia‟s presidential election in March 2000, when Putin was, as Russian prime 
minister, only acting president of Russia and, more importantly, a candidate in the 
forthcoming election. 
Given the readiness of Prime Minister Blair to raise the faltering state of Russian 
democracy in talks with President Putin in subsequent years, it is unfortunate that this 
first meeting between the two in effect served to endorse Putin‟s candidature above those 
of the other candidates so near to an election. That the Blair camp were aware of this 
difficulty seems likely given the fact that Downing Street went to the trouble of 
emphasising that the prime minister‟s visit was not „official‟ but in response to a 
„personal invitation‟ from Putin. Although it was indeed the case that the initiative for the 
meeting had come from the Russian side, such a distinction between „official‟ and 
„personal‟ appears sophistic, given that the meeting resulted in a number of policy-related 
statements, a photo-call for the press, and Blair reportedly telling the media that his 
enjoyment of the dialogue with Putin was „a very good omen for the future‟, thereby 
appearing to endorse Putin‟s candidature ahead of the polls.5 Of course it made perfect 
sense from one point of view for the British prime minister to forge early positive 
relations with Putin. The suspicion remains, however, that Putin had an eye on 
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electioneering when inviting perhaps the most eye-catching European leader of the time 
to St Petersburg a fortnight before polling day, and that the British leader was a little too 
eager to take this opportunity, rather than waiting a couple of weeks for the Russian 
people to confirm that Putin was indeed their chosen head of state. 
Whatever the precise machinations behind the March 2000 visit, Blair received his 
reward in kind, with Vladimir Putin making London the destination for his first foreign 
trip on being elected president – albeit with a stopover in Belarus en route. German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had let it be known that he would be glad to have an „early 
visit‟ with Putin, but instead the Kremlin opted for a visit to London in April 2000, in a 
move which some Russian observers interpreted as marking a break with Yeltsin‟s focus 
on the Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis and reflecting Russian unhappiness with German 
attitudes to the Chechen conflict.
6
 It is ironic that what Russia should see as Britain‟s 
unhelpful attitude to the situation in Chechnya should in later years play such a key role 
in souring these initially close relations. 
Blair and Putin – a relationship in decline 
The state and the status of the Blair-Putin relationship in 2006 are both markedly 
diminished from that which held six years earlier. Russia‟s increasingly confident stance 
as a self-styled „sovereign democracy‟ on the world stage has meant that notions of using 
the United Kingdom as a means of approach to the United States are no longer 
considered necessary, since direct communication with the US leadership occurs 
regularly enough. Furthermore, the imminent departure of Tony Blair from the prime 
ministership, alongside a series of bilateral grievances, render the utility of Britain-
Russian summitry somewhat diminished.  
As noted above, the bilateral aspects of the UK‟s relationship with Russia must be 
viewed within a wider setting. The bilateral downturn of 2003 onwards was ameliorated 
to some extent in 2005 and 2006 by the necessity for closer relations between the UK and 
Russia within the multilateral context, since Britain held the presidency of the G8 
throughout 2005, and the EU presidency in the second half of 2005. The handover of the 
G8 presidency from Britain to Russia required heightened diplomatic contact, but such 
contact occurred in parallel with declining bilateral relations, running alongside but not 
touching. As UK-Russian relations seemed to become increasingly tetchy and 
problematic in many aspects, within the context of the EU, the G8 and other international 
fora cooperation continued, and – measured by trade and investment statistics – relations 
flourished. However, at what the Russians call „the highest level‟, the previous warmth 
between Blair and Putin demonstrably cooled, as a range of disagreements emerged. 
From the Putin side there have been a number of occasions where the Russian president 
has not shied away from seeking to embarrass Blair publicly. The first noticeable such 
occurrence stemmed from UK-Russian disagreement over the need to go to war in Iraq in 
2003. In an April 2003 meeting in Moscow, Putin punctured any sense of triumph that 
the British prime minister may have been feeling over the successful toppling of the 
Saddam Hussein regime by coalition forces, concentrating instead on the fate of Saddam 
and the weapons of mass destruction, which both Blair and Putin still thought at the time 
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to exist. In a somewhat mocking remark as he sat opposite Blair in a post-summit press 
conference, President Putin asked rhetorically, „where is Saddam? And where are these 
weapons for which the war was started? Well perhaps Saddam is sitting on these boxes in 
his secret bunker and thinking that he might blast all this stuff and threaten the life of 
mankind‟. According to one newspaper report from the press conference, none of the 
Russian journalists present thought that Putin would take a stubborn line with Blair. They 
were wrong.
7
  
Disagreement over the Iraq war between its opponents led by France, Russia, China, and 
Germany on the one hand, and supporters led by US, Britain, Spain, Italy on the other 
was based on a complex of issues which lie outside of the scope of this chapter. 
Nonetheless, a contributing factor to Russian opposition was dislike of a global order 
dominated by an interventionist United States. The Putin regime‟s emphasis on the 
concept of national sovereignty is a reflection of this strongly held view, and in domestic 
terms it can be seen in Russia‟s reaction to what it sees as Western interference in issues 
such as the Chechen conflict and the state of Russian democracy. Irritation on Putin‟s 
part at being asked by a British journalist about democracy in Russia led to a further 
example of Putin publicly making capital out of Blair‟s domestic political 
embarrassments at the 2006 G8 summit in St Petersburg. In responding to the journalist‟s 
questions, Putin raised the case of Lord Levy, the Labour party fundraiser who had just 
been arrested by British police investigating whether honours had been sold in return for 
donations to the party. Blair was said to be „privately fuming‟ at this remark aimed at one 
of his closest advisers.
8
 
The list of apparent faux pas in the relationship between Blair and Putin is not, however, 
entirely one way. In May 2005 Prime Minister Blair failed to appreciate the importance 
to Russia of the Victory Day celebrations marking the 60
th
 anniversary of the fall of 
Berlin to Soviet troops at the end of the Second World War. U.S. President George W. 
Bush, China‟s leader Hu Jintao, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Polish 
President Aleksander Kwasniewski, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French 
president Jacques Chirac were all amongst those attending. Britain was represented, 
however, only by the deputy prime minister, John Prescott. Although Tony Blair 
apologised, citing the general election of five days earlier and the demands of forming his 
cabinet, some Russian press reports observed regretfully that he „considered internal 
party matters more significant than the Moscow ceremony‟, and noted similar 
unflattering criticism in the British press.
9
 It seems likely that Downing Street with 
hindsight may have considered Blair‟s absence from the Victory Day celebrations a 
mistake. Certainly the prime minister went out of his way to explain himself in this 
regard when he visited Putin a month later as part of the preparation for July‟s G8 summit 
in Scotland. Mr Blair emphasised that “On May 9, I was busy forming a new 
government, and, unfortunately, I was unable to come. But I would like to take the 
opportunity to commemorate the courage and heroism of the Russian people, who drove 
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back fascism. I would like to remind you that cooperation between Russia and Britain in 
this endeavor was among the closest of all.”10 
 
Visas, extradition and NGOs 
Although the relationship between Blair and Putin serves as a useful indicator of Britain-
Russia relations, it is by no means the whole story. On one hand, as noted above, there 
are consistent mutual interests which foster interaction advantageous to both states in 
specific spheres of activity, many of which are covered elsewhere in this volume. In 
particular, when emphasising the positive in Britain-Russia relations the focus repeatedly 
falls on financial and business relations. In trade terms, the UK is a relatively small-scale 
partner in comparison with other European countries, China, and the United States, 
accounting in 2004 for 3.1 per cent of the total volume of Russian exports, with 2.7 per 
cent of imports into Russia coming from the UK.
11
 Nonetheless these figures were a 
significant increase on previous years. 
Investment data, however, are much more impressive. British investments in Russia in 
2005 reached nearly $8.5 billion, out of a total of $53.7 billion, while Russian 
investments in Great Britain were higher than $12.5 billion, making Russia one of the top 
foreign investors in the British economy.
12
 London has become a centre for Russian 
businessmen and investors, exemplified in the public eye by Roman Abramovich‟s 
investment in Chelsea Football Club and by the annual Russian Economic Forum, which 
will meet in London for the 10
th
 year in succession in 2007 and each year attracts many 
Russian businessmen and high-ranking politicians.  
On the other hand, even these areas of activity have raised tensions at the highest levels 
in 2006. The Browder case is one example of apparently arbitrary – even perverse – 
action by Russia undermining relations. William Browder, an American-born British 
citizen, is CEO of Hermitage Capital Management, Russia‟s biggest foreign portfolio 
investor. He was denied entry to Russia in November 2005, and his efforts to regain his 
visa were backed by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and reportedly raised 
personally by Tony Blair in his meeting with President Putin at the G8 Summit in St 
Petersburg, July 2006. 
Browder is known for two stances in particular. First, he has been an indefatigable 
advocate of foreign investment in Russia and unfailingly optimistic about Russia‟s 
growth prospects. At the 2005 World Economic Forum in Davos he was almost a lone 
voice promoting Russia, gathering together a group of influential journalists for a 
breakfast at which he gave a presentation to make this case. Second, he has fought 
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equally tirelessly for good corporate governance and shareholders‟ rights in Russia, 
campaigning for the same with regard to such Russian giants as Unified Energy Systems, 
Sberbank, Gazprom, and Surgutneftegaz. 
There has been no public statement explaining the removal of Browder‟s right to travel to 
Russia. A letter to Hermitage Capital Management in January reportedly stated simply 
that the decision was in line with Russia‟s immigration law barring entry to those 
considered a threat to the security of the state, public order or public health. Browder‟s 
campaigns for better corporate governance have annoyed senior figures in Russian 
business and the assumption of many is that this lies behind the decision to ban him from 
Russia. To refuse him a visa looks vindictive and arbitrary, as well as creating a bad press 
in the West. 
If the British government is agitated by the Browder case, then the Russian government is 
annoyed at Britain over the refusal of British courts to extradite 16 men – including 
businessman Boris Berezovsky, Chechen emissary Akhmed Zakayev, and executives of 
the YUKOS oil company – which it accuses of a range of offences from terrorism, 
through tax fraud, to plotting to overthrow the government. President Putin apparently 
remains convinced that such refusals are politically motivated and that if the UK 
government wanted to, it could arrange for the extraditions to happen. The notion of the 
separation of judiciary and executive appears to remain somewhat alien to Russia in this 
particular sphere. 
The appointment of Yurii Chaika to the position of Prosecutor General in summer 2006 
appears to herald renewed attempts to secure the desired extraditions, but this time with a 
declared emphasis on preparing more robust legal cases than previously.
13
 The Russian 
Prosecutor General‟s Office has launched a new case based on charges of instigating 
ethnic enmity against Zakayev. The Prosecutor General‟s Office therefore claims that 
interviews given by Zakayev which allegedly incite the hatred and the force against 
ethnic Russians come under the UK‟s law on terrorism which restricts calling for 
committing or preparing terrorist acts.
14
 
Even so, there is by no means any guarantee of success, and indeed it appears unlikely 
that unless new evidence or charges are forthcoming, Russia‟s requests will continue to 
be frustrated by the British legal system. The UK‟s official position has been clear, 
however: Russia must meet two criteria before extradition processes can begin. First, the 
evidence against these people must be more coherent and convincing; second, UK courts 
must be convinced of the guarantee of a fair trial in Russia. The UK official emphasis has 
been on the independence of the courts and judiciary and inability of the government to 
influence this for political reasons. 
To the Putin team, however, the British stance on these extradition cases represents just 
one example of what it is increasingly referring to as the West‟s „double standards‟. At 
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the Conference of Prosecutors General of Europe in Moscow in July 2006 Putin declared 
that Russia is: 
open for honest and non-politicised dialogue on human rights issues. We 
want this dialogue to focus on finding solutions to concrete problems. There 
are plenty of problems both in the West and in the East. But it is unacceptable 
to us that human rights issues should be used as a means of exerting political 
pressure or pursuing opportunistic aims of any sort … We find it hard to 
explain, for example, why some countries refuse to extradite terrorism 
suspects and even go as far as to give them some kind of „political‟ status.15 
Continuing frustration with the failure of the UK to extradite Zakayev also led Putin to 
emphasise his implication that the UK harboured terrorists, arguing “when we are told, 
„let‟s bring up the subject of Syria‟, or Iran or any more countries that cover [foreign] 
terrorists, why not mention other countries as well?‟16 
A reflection of this view that issues such as human rights and legal affairs are political 
affairs both for the UK and for Russia is apparent in the way in which Russia has 
clamped down on British support for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Russia 
in recent years. The Russian Interior Ministry‟s Economic and Tax Fraud Service 
demanded to examine the British Council‟s financial records in June 2004, with the 
demands only being dropped after a meeting between Putin and Tony Blair and a halt 
being called to most of the Council‟s programs in Russia several months later. However, 
by 2006 similar demands were being made again.
17
 Echoes of the Browder case can also 
be found in relation to human rights issues. In November 2005 Professor Bill Bowring, a 
respected human rights lawyer with many years experience of working in Russia, was 
held at Moscow‟s Sheremetovo airport on his way into Russia, before having his multi-
entry visa cancelled. 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, spy scandals have remained a constant in 
UK-Russia relations throughout the post-Soviet era. In addition to the two instances 
mentioned there, in May 2005 MI5 reportedly warned government departments in the UK 
of the existence of 32 Russian agents operating under diplomatic cover from the Russian 
embassy in London. The warning apparently went so far as to identify the number plates 
of cars used by the alleged Russian agents, and to cite their activity as „substantial‟ threat 
to the UK.
18
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As noted above, this need not in itself be particularly significant in terms of UK-Russia 
relations – we know that countries spy on each other, and sometimes spies get caught. 
What was of particular interest though was the way in which the FSB spokesmen on the 
television programme went out of their way to link allegations of espionage to the 
activities of NGOs. Much of the 22 January 2006 broadcast was devoted to the FSB‟s 
case, with documentary evidence, that one of the alleged spies had also been the 
signatory for financial grants from the UK government to the various NGOs, including 
the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Eurasia Foundation. 
A second broadcast on 29 January continued to give details, from FSB sources, of further 
NGOs which had received money authorised by alleged British spies. The evidence 
provided by the FSB for the existence of a British spy network may have seemed 
convincing, but the evidence that NGOs were receiving money from foreign intelligence 
agencies, and by implication acting as a front for them, was almost non-existent. Any 
accredited British diplomat engaged in espionage in Moscow will have a formal position 
in the Embassy, such as that held by the diplomat in question in this case in the political 
section. The fact that he may have signed off financial grants in the course of his formal 
duties is entirely regular for a member of that section. The money granted to those NGOs 
named by the FSB has long been a matter of open public record and, as Lyudmilla 
Alekseyeva, chairperson of the Moscow Helsinki Group, pointed out, it is no secret that 
many NGOs receive money from abroad, that does not make them spies. 
UK political reactions to YUKOS & UK concerns about democracy in Russia, 
particularly given your comments on p.3? 
Conclusions 
A complex range of issues undermined high level relations between the UK and Russia in 
recent years, and many of these remain unresolved. Four stand out. 
First, many of the negative elements souring UK-Russian relations have come about 
because, despite formal declarations and engagement within multilateral fora such as the 
EU-Russian partnership framework and the G8, there has increasingly been a focus on 
bilateral elements in the relationship. Under this heading come issues such as the refusal 
of British courts to extradite men wanted in Russia for alleged offences relating to 
terrorism, the Yukos affair, and security matters; Russian actions such as depriving high-
profile British visitors of their visas and putting pressure on the activities of the British 
Council in Russia and on the funding of non-governmental organisations by Britain; and 
heightened attention being given on both sides to espionage matters. 
Second, decreasing unity on the part of „the West‟ in the early years of the 21st century 
has encouraged differentiation in Russia‟s foreign policy towards western powers, and 
has intensified competition between European powers with regard to good relations with 
Russia. Despite frequent arguments by some observers that the era of the nation state is 
gone and the era of globalisation is here, this is far from the case in Putin‟s foreign policy 
and in UK-Russian relations.  
Third, the personal impact of Prime Minister Tony Blair as a key interlocutor has 
declined since the beginning of the century. When President Putin came to power in 
2000, Tony Blair was seen by many as the most influential leader in Europe, a man of the 
 10 
future as opposed to the other leaders of key western powers who seemed to be on their 
way out. Six years later, however, Blair‟s political stature had diminished, not least 
because he was nearing the end of his prime ministership, and new leaders in Europe – 
such as Chancellor Merkel of Germany – were coming to the fore. Furthermore, any role 
for Prime Minister Blair as a bridge between Russia and the United States was less 
necessary. 
Fourth, and related to the above, there are serious “value” differences between the UK 
and Russia. Two examples illustrate this. First, there is the difference over the 
independence of important elements of non-governmental society, such as the judiciary 
and big business – highlighted both by the examples of extradition and the discussions 
surrounding Gazprom‟s acquisition of Centrica. Second, the UK support for grass-roots 
society is at odds with the Russian approach, illustrated by the differing approaches to 
NGOs. 
To put it bluntly, the importance of the Blair-Putin relationship to Russia, and indeed the 
political relationship between Britain and Russia as a whole, has decreased notably in 
recent years. This will not remain the case for ever, and even as it has occurred, mutual 
interests and obligations have continued to keep formal contacts and cooperation on 
many levels positive. However, simultaneously it raises the importance of the role of 
other actors, particularly those in business and security fields in maintaining the 
relationship, while the ability of the political dimension to enhance these contacts or 
support them in case of difficulty is reduced. It may take the replacement of both Blair 
and Putin, planned in each case by mid-2008, to provide a public boost to elite level 
relations. 
  
